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Abstract 
 
By formulating an endogenous growth model that combines elements from Romer (1990), 
Aghion and Howitt (1992), and van Zon and Yetkiner (2003), the present paper studies the 
contribution of education and training on economic growth through their impact on the rate of 
innovation. The article addresses two main issues. The first is the optimum provision of on-the-
job training necessary to be able to adopt, and adapt to new technologies. The second is the 
impact of both formal education and on-the-job training on the innovative capacity of an economic 
system that is the ultimate cause of output growth. In our set-up, education enhances R&D 
activities and lowers adjustment costs to new technologies, thus facilitating their adoption, while 
on the other hand on-the-job training ensures the possibility to implement the new coming 
technologies and reap all the related future profits.  
 We assume that the adoption of a new technology consists of two periods, i.e. the training 
phase during which newly hired workers acquire the right amount of know how in order to 
become familiar with the specific new technology, and the implementation or  production phase in 
which profit flows arise for firms and in which the cost savings that can be realized arise from 
productivity increases in the previous phase. By extending the training phase, entrepreneurs run 
a greater risk of shortening the production phase for a given arrival rate of new technologies that 
progressively erode the profit flows obtained from existing technologies.  
 The paper shows first that it is possible to find a profit-maximizing, endogenously 
determined, amount of training that depends on the workers’ educational attainment. Thus, a 
situation in which better educated workers may be disproportionately selected for training issues 
is possible, especially in times of rapid technological change. However, the paper also shows  that 
a non-linear relationship between education and technological change (and growth) exists, so that 
an increase in the formal level of   education can even result in a reduction in the rate of growth. 
The reason for this is the increase in creative destruction that raises ‘technology adoption costs’ 
in terms of output foregone during re-training spells that arrive at a faster rate. The results offer 
some insights that are interesting from an education policy perspective.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The purpose of the paper is to study the contribution of education and 
training to economic growth through their impact on the rate of innovation, by 
formulating an endogenous growth model that combines elements from Romer 
(1990), Aghion and Howitt (1998) and van Zon and Yetkiner (2003). The model 
takes the endogeneity of firms’ training decisions into account and addresses 
two main issues. The first concerns the profit-maximizing provision of 
workplace training necessary to be able to adopt, and adapt to, new 
technologies. The second concerns the impact of formal education and on-the-
job training on the innovative capacity of an economic system that is the 
ultimate cause of output growth. In our set-up, education and employer-
provided training fulfil two different functions: general education programmes, 
whose costs are mainly borne by individuals, households and public 
administrations, increase the opportunities for future research and lower 
adjustment costs to new technologies, thus facilitating their adoption, while 
firm-specific training programmes ensure the profitable adoption of the new 
technologies.  
Our setting links the labour economics literature on education and 
training and the endogenous growth literature on human capital formation as 
the primary cause of productivity growth. So far, training, and especially its 
interaction with formal schooling, has hardly been investigated in the growth 
literature. The reason why we have chosen to pursue this combination of 
different strands of literature is that, since the 1980’s, massive shifts have 
occurred in skill requirements in the workforce as a result of rapid technological 
progress and skill-biased technical change (David, 1990; Acemoglu, 1996, 
2002; Lopez-Bassols, 2002; Bartel et al., 2003). This emphasizes at least the 
practical importance of the availability of skills through education and training 
for economic growth. As Breshnahan et al. state: “The shift toward more skilled 
workers appears to have accelerated in the last 25 years relative to 1940-1973, 
especially over the period 1980 until the mid-1990s. Over this period, demand has 
strongly shifted from low-and middle-wage occupations and skills toward highly 
rewarded jobs and tasks, those requiring exceptional talent, training, autonomy, or 
management ability” (2002, p. 339).  
With the breakthrough of ICTs in the 1990s as a general purpose 
technology (GPT), many occupations and professions now require skills that are 
a mix of studies that are privately undertaken and which are necessary to enter 
certain segments of the labour market, and skills which have been acquired on 
the job. Therefore, formal education is not sufficient anymore for explaining 
international differences in growth performances: whenever specialization 
matters, on-the-job training, at least, plays a crucial role besides schooling.    
 
 
1.1. New technology and training: an overview of the literature  
 
 The way in which an economy responds to the arrival of a new major 
technology has been analyzed both at microeconomic and at macroeconomic 
level. At microeconomic level, the first attempts emphasizing the importance of 
education and training investments in relation with technological change are 
the ones by Nelson and Phelps (1966)  and Mincer (1962, 1989). Besides these 
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seminal contributions, we have also to consider the recent literature borne 
around the issue of new technology adoption, the standard theory of the firm 
and the relative choices in terms of human capital investments and 
organizational changes (Pencavel, 1972; Parsons, 1990; Kalaitzidakis, 1997, 
Gander 2002). Outside the standard theory of the firm an important 
contribution which analyzes the interactions between the creation of specific 
human capital and the destruction of this same human capital engendered by 
the technological and organizational change is the one by Antonelli and 
Maggioni (1997). In their model, this relationship is non-linear and shows some 
features associated with the ‘catastrophe theory’. In particular, as the rate of 
technological change increases, the long-term equilibrium of a worker’s specific 
human capital diminishes. After a certain threshold is reached, this same 
worker will no longer be able to accumulate human capital through work and 
will therefore be eliminated from the productive process.  
 At macroeconomic level, the way in which an economic system responds 
to the arrival of a new major technology has been described in the growth 
literature focusing on general purpose technologies (GPTs). In that literature 
researchers have been mainly interested in investigating the role played by 
mechanisms like secondary innovations, diffusion, and learning by firms 
(Greenwood and Yorokoglu, 1997; Helpman and Trajtenberg, 1998a, 1998b; 
Aghion and Howitt, 1992, 1998). In particular, in their models Aghion and 
Howitt put the attention on the role played of R&D activity on economic growth, 
and on the process of Schumpeterian creative destruction activated by fast 
technological change on output growth.  In their setup, growth is generated by a 
stochastic sequence of quality improving innovations that result from uncertain 
research activities. The main characteristic of vertical innovation is that new 
inventions make old technologies or products obsolete. This obsolescence, also 
called ‘creative destruction’, implies a negative relationship between current and 
future research, which results in the existence of a unique steady-state 
equilibrium and also in the possibility of cyclical growth patterns. The model 
leads to the conclusion that if the rate of technological progress in plants is very 
fast, then plants will have a short lifetime and hence the proportion of workers 
released every period will be high. The rapid flow of workers into unemployment 
will generate a high steady-state unemployment rate.  
In addition, the faster rate of plant obsolescence reduces the payout 
period to a firm’s investment in plants. By discouraging the creation of the new 
plants that are the source of new job opening, it thus tends to reduce the job-
finding rate in the economy, leading to a higher steady-state unemployment 
rate. We can call this effect ‘indirect creative destruction’ (Aghion and Howitt, 
1998, p. 143).  
 Recently, Heplman and Rangel (1999) and  Krueger and Kumar (2002),  
focus the attention on a new mechanism, the interplay between technological 
change and two types of human capital: technology-specific experience or 
vocational education and training. The first of the two models show that 
technological change requiring more education and training (so that a 
technology-education complementarity arises), like computerization and ICTs 
diffusion, necessarily produces an initial slowdown, whereas technological 
change requiring less education and training (technology and education are 
substitutes), like the move from artisan shop to the factory, can produce either 
a boom or a bust. The second, instead, show that economic systems whose 
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policies favour vocational education, like European Union, will grow slower than 
systems favouring general education, like the US, this gap increasing with 
growth rate of available technology.  
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1.2 The interaction between general education and specific training in 
adopting new technologies: theory and evidence from the literature 
 
The literature on labour economics since the 1960s1 has often stressed 
the importance of activities like training, learning by doing and experience in 
the process of human capital accumulation, both at the individual and at the 
firm level. For, as early as 1962, Mincer states that formal school instruction is 
neither an exclusive nor a sufficient method of training the labour force. 
Graduation from some level of schooling does not signify the completion of a 
training process. It is usually the end of a more general and preparatory stage, 
and the beginning of a more specialized and often prolonged process of 
acquisition of occupational skills, after entry in the labour force. This second 
stage, training on the job, ranges from formally organized activities such as 
apprenticeships and other training programs to informal processes of learning 
from experience.  
According to Acemoglu:“(T)raining is important when new technologies are 
adopted, or in the process of a radical change in the environment, for example the shift 
from low to high skill jobs taking place in most OECD countries today” (1996, p. 446). 
The importance of the distinction between formal education and 
workplace training has been also empirically stressed in many research studies. 
The first we mention was carried out in 1979 and concerned workers in 
Germany (Pischke, 2001), while the second and the third2 concerned Canadian 
workers in 1989 and 1993 respectively. Moreover, we can also mention a fourth 
source of evidence: the Eurostat’s Continuing Vocational Training Survey 
(CVTS) (OECD, 2003).The main conclusions from that studies are that: i) the 
most common channel through which manufacturing workers obtain the most 
important skills for the labour market is continuous formal on-the-job training; 
ii) the most important place where they received the most useful skills for the 
labour market is the firm, the workplace, the second being school and higher 
education institutions. Other indicative data in this field are the ones provided 
by the BLS Survey of Employer-Provided Training (Frazis et al., 1995), the US 
Educational Quality of the Workforce National Employers Survey (EQW-NES) 
and Lynch (1995). According to these analyses, companies provide training 
because firm-specific skills are needed, because of changes in technology, and 
to retain employees; not only, but basic skills are often easier to learn when 
taught in the context of a job.  
  While there is ample empirical evidence that the distinction between 
education and on-the-job training is important in shaping and improving 
individuals’ skills endowments, the logical next question is whether these types 
of training are really substitutes or complements. The positive links discussed 
above between training and technical change on the one hand and education 
and technical change on the other, suggests such a positive correlation also for 
education and training. A direct, albeit partial, answer to this question also 
comes from Mincer (1962), who recognizes that the degree of substitutability 
                                                 
1 We are referring to the ‘human capital revolution’ driven by the Chicago School (Lewis, Mincer, Becker) 
even if we should always keep in mind that the very seminal contribution on this field has been provided by 
Adam Smith in the 18th century.  
2 In particular we are referring to the Survey of Manufacturing Technology (1989) and the Survey of 
Innovation and Advanced Technology (1993).  
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between the two varies among jobs and over time with changes of technology. 
However, he also admits that a positive association between education and 
training is not definitional but is an empirical inference from the observed 
income data. More schooling, in fact, seems to involve more training, both 
formal and informal, though not necessarily in a fixed proportion. School 
education, indeed, is a prerequisite, a basis on which to build additional, more 
specialized, training. Due to the difficulty collecting data at the firm and the 
individual level, the empirical evidence is ambiguous. What we do know from 
the data is that a positive association between education and job training can 
and has been inferred from differential slopes of experience profiles of wages 
(Mincer 1984, 1988a, 1988b).  
The more recent emphasis on worker training stems from the evidence 
that a more highly-skilled workforce is needed, and that effective training is 
closely linked to the workplace and to employer needs. The earnings and 
employment opportunities of less-educated workers have declined substantially 
over the last decade. The earning gap between  more and less educated workers 
widened, as did the level of earnings dispersion among workers with the same 
level of education. These trends have led many researchers to conclude that 
there has been a steady increase in the demand for skilled workers (Bartel, 
1995; Breshanan et al., 2002; U.S. DOL, 1994).  
 International evidence on the complementary nature of education and 
training comes also from Brown (1989), Lynch and Black (1995), Brunello 
(2001) and OECD (2001). Adults with high levels of educational attainment are 
also more likely to receive more training. On average, three times as many job-
related training hours are invested in adults with a tertiary qualification 
compared to those with less than an upper-secondary qualification. Moreover, 
training tends to reinforce skill differences resulting from an unequal 
participation in initial education. Participation rates in both job-related 
continuing education and training and in all continuing education and training 
rise with levels of educational attainment. Bartel and Lichtenberg (1987) and 
Lillard and Tan (1986) show that the positive association between initial 
education and participation in continuing education and training remains 
strong even after controlling for other characteristics affecting participation in 
training. Workers tend to receive more training in countries with higher overall 
average levels of educational attainment, as well as in countries that devote a 
larger share of GDP to research and development, or that achieve a strong trade 
performance in “high-tech” industries. These patterns suggest that initial 
education and continuing education and training are mutually reinforcing, and 
that education combines with other factors to make adult training least 
common among those who need it most. Still other empirical support for the 
complementary nature of education and training comes from Heijke et al. 
(2003), who find a positive correlation between the level of generic competencies 
acquired through tertiary education and training participation of young 
workers. In addition, the amount of on-the-job training needed is positively 
related to the actual vocational competencies mismatches, as training is needed 
to adjust the acquired competencies to the required ones.  
 Human capital theory offers a general answer to why higher-educated 
workers engage in more training on the job: persons that have greater learning 
ability and better opportunities to finance the costs of human capital 
investments, do indeed invest more in all forms of human capital, including 
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schooling and job training (Mincer, 1991). Moreover, some analysts claim that 
school education is a complementary factor to job training in producing human 
capital: this is in line with the idea that generic competencies acquired in higher 
education reduce the costs of further learning by providing higher learning 
abilities for graduates. In other words, education enhances the productivity of 
job training at work. It is clear, however, that schooling can also be a substitute 
for job training: thus, the decline in apprenticeship has been attributed to 
growth in educational levels over the long-run. Finally, both school education 
and job training are more profitable where productivity growth is more rapid.  
 
 
1.3 Stylized facts regarding the link between technology adoption, 
education and training 
 
Empirical facts about the link between technical change and education and 
training can be summarized as follows:   
 
1. a more rapid pace of technology in a sector generates an increased demand 
for education and training of the sectorial workforce (Bartel and Lichtenberg, 
1987). Autor et al. (1998) also show that industries with greater growth in 
employee computer usage or with more computers per worker have 
upgraded the skills of their workforce at a faster rate. Increasing use of 
computer technology, restructuring of business, and a growing global 
economy are some of the factors economists cite as contributing to changes 
in the employment structure of the U.S. economy since the early 1980s. 
Furthermore, there is considerable growth projected to occur in occupations 
with higher educational requirements; the job classifications that currently 
use low-skilled workers are experiencing "upskilling," which translates into a 
need for more responsibility, more knowledge, and ultimately more skill; 
and, there has been stagnation and even a decrease in the number of jobs 
that are unskilled or very low skilled (Barnow et al. 1990); 
2. more-educated workers are utilized the younger the age of equipment, and 
this effect is magnified in R&D-intensive industries (Bartel and Lichtenberg, 
1987). In addition countries investing a higher share of GDP in R&D or 
having a higher share of researchers in the workforce also tend to have 
higher training rates and better educated workers (OECD, 1999); 
3. there is a greater prevalence of on the job training in sectors in which 
measures of productivity growth are higher (Lillard and Tan, 1986). 
Bresnahan et al. (2002) also find that ICT measures, in particular ICT and 
workplace organization, are correlated with policies for greater investments 
in human capital, i.e. training and screening of new employees on the basis 
of their education;  
4. over the long run, technologically more progressive industries tend to utilize 
more-educated workers among the younger workers (Gill, 1988; Bresnahan 
et al. , 2002; Lopez-Bassols, 2002);  
5. the bias of technological change toward human capital means that in the 
short run, wages of more-educated workers increase more or are reduced 
less in sectors with more-rapid productivity growth. Thus, wage profiles are 
steeper in progressive sectors as profitability of training and experience 
increases (Bartel, 1995; Muysken and Ruholl, 2001);  
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6. finally, Lazear (2002) and European Commission (2001) show that students 
who have a more general curriculum have a higher chance of becoming 
entrepreneurs, a trend that proxies the successful adoption of new 
technologies. And that seems to be more frequent in the US – where the 
emphasis is put on the development of general skills - rather than in Europe 
– where more vocational-oriented training programmes seem to prevail.  
 
Summarising the points above, education and training are in higher demand 
where productivity growth is more rapid because the technological changes in 
production processes that underlie productivity growth, require the training and 
retraining of workers. Faster technical change requires a faster replacement of 
skills that become obsolete. This requires more training on the one hand  
and/or a greater ability to train, i.e. a higher level of education. In fact, if 
technological change and the relative process of adoption/absorption  are in 
some degree firm-specific, the firm will tend offer training after initially hiring 
more educated and more-adaptable individuals who, in turn, serve as the 
‘teachers’ making use of the partial non excludability of knowledge.  
 
 1.4 Roundup and basic model features 
 
Rounding up, there are five important relations between education, training 
and technological change that we can extract from the theoretical and empirical 
studies referred to above: 
  
1. The positive link between productivity on the one hand, and training and 
education on the other; 
2. The positive link between high levels of education and R&D; 
3. The positive link between high levels of R&D and growth;  
4. The nature of the interplay between education and training; 
5. The nature of the link between high levels of growth (through technical 
change) and training, i.e. the relative increase in importance of education 
as a source of growth relative to training in times of fast technical change 
(Lindbeck and Snower, 2000). 
 
We consider the first two relations to be ‘stylised facts’ comparable in nature 
to logical premises. The third point derives from the basic assumptions of R&D- 
based endogenous growth models and is supported by numerous econometric 
studies. Points 4 and 5 we consider to be relations that should logically follow 
from the premises 1 to 3. We use these relations as the basis for the 
construction of an endogenous growth model that supports our belief that 
human capital, in the form of not only education but also time-consuming on-
the-job training,  has a positive impact on innovations’ - and thus economic - 
growth. At the same time we think that schooling as a proxy for human capital 
endowment is not sufficient to describe the process through which workers and 
firms cope with innovations and rapid technological change. General education 
is important for making people more ‘flexible’ in learning specific skills, while 
on-the-job training is essential in order to reduce the vocational mismatches 
(Heijke et al., 2003) that new products, new processes and new organizational 
practices create. In our setting it is technical progress that opens the possibility 
to have a mismatch between the competencies embodied in individuals through 
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schooling and the competencies that firms require in their production 
processes. Technological change generates new jobs or tasks that, in turn, 
require new and/or more complex skills: these competencies are not completely 
acquired through formal schooling, but they can only be learnt and experienced 
on the job, thus reducing time per worker that can effectively be allocated to the 
actual production process. Thus, the firm faces a trade-off: by spending 
resources and time in educating its workforce on the job, the firm, by one side, 
builds its ‘knowledge-base’, but, on the other side, it has to spend time out to 
learn about the new production process associated with new 
technologies/products. By doing that, it also runs the risk that a new 
technology will come on-line making the specific competencies just acquired by 
the workforce rapidly obsolete.  
We implement this general trade-off by adopting the links 1-3 listed 
above, and by considering both formal schooling and on-the-job training as the 
main channels through which individuals acquire generic and technology-
specific competences. In doing so we will assume that human capital 
endowments of individuals are a combination of vocational competencies of a 
particular field of studies and generic competencies. The former includes field-
specific theoretical knowledge and field-specific knowledge of methods, while 
the latter includes learning abilities, reflective thinking, problem-solving 
abilities, analytical competencies, documenting ideas and information.  
 One of the main assumptions of the model is that the effectiveness by 
which more-educated workers are able to improve their competencies and their 
labour productivity is determined by the level of skills acquired during the 
initial phase of education. A higher level of education is therefore useful in three 
ways: first, it is the basis for future R&D activities; second, it positively affects 
individual labour productivity; third, it allows taking part in training with a 
higher productivity since higher-educated individuals learn more quickly and 
are therefore less costly to (re-) train. By modelling the productivity of a worker 
as a geometric average of his level of education and training, we will effectively 
be treating these two channels as direct substitutes at the microeconomic level. 
We will then look at the association between education and training at the 
macroeconomic level to find out whether we can reproduce stylised fact number 
4, that is somewhat ambiguous in that most material seems to point to a 
positive, and thus complementary, link between education and training, while 
some material points to a negative link between education and training, and 
hence education and training would have to be substitutes, not only at the 
micro-level, but also at the macro-level. Premises 2 and 3 are covered by using 
the Romer (1990) model as a template for our own exercise. 
The remainder of the article is organised as follows. Section 2 contains a 
description of the model, including sensitivity analyses that we have performed 
to show how training and education depend on each other in the framework of 
intertemporal profit maximisation. We also show how the integration of this 
training behaviour in a general equilibrium growth setting influences the growth 
results. Because the model is strongly non-linear, we use numerical simulation 
to show how it works, and what kind of conclusions can be reached regarding 
the growth, education and training nexus. Section 3 provides the results of 
some numerical experiments we have performed with the model, while section 4 
includes a summary and some concluding remarks. 
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2. The model 
 
2.1. Basic model set-up 
 
 The model combines elements from various endogenous growth models, 
especially the one by Romer (1990) and Aghion and Howitt (1992). It also uses 
insights from similar modelling exercises in van Zon and Yetkiner (2003). In 
order to keep the model as simple as possible, we only have two types of labour 
as factors of production. The one type of labour is low-skilled3 that only has a 
use in producing output and high-skilled labour that has an alternative use in 
the form of designing blueprints for new production technologies. There is no 
capital, so no saving decision needs to be made.  The model starts from the 
assumption that the introduction of a new technology requires the users to 
learn how to adopt them effectively and efficiently. In order to do that, the 
workforce associated with a new technology needs to be trained first.4 During 
their training period, the workers are supposed to earn a competitive wage, 
since they are assumed to be indifferent between working (and so ‘earning their 
keep’) and training (thus learning to ‘earn their keep’ later on). During the 
training period, workers that are trained are not working; hence they do not 
produce anything. Therefore, the costs of training include both the direct costs 
of wages that have to be offered to the trainees and the opportunity costs of not 
producing anything while training. No direct, fixed or sunk outlays are 
considered here. The benefits from training are an increased productivity later 
on during the production phase of a technology. This increase in productivity 
enables the owners of the firms that use new technologies to economise on 
wage-costs during the production phase. Training therefore generates cost-
reductions in the future in return for current cost-increases. 
 Because we assume that there is no production while training, it follows 
immediately that a model with complete creative destruction of old technologies 
through the arrival of new technologies is less suited for our purposes, since it 
would generate ‘odd’ growth patterns that can not be observed in reality. For, in 
such a creative destruction setting, the arrival of a new superior technology 
would lead to a zero level of output, while the workforce is re-trained to be used 
with the new technology. Instead, a Romer (1990) like approach seems to be 
more suited, since in that case new technologies do not fully replace old ones, 
but gradually drive them out of the market. This is the ‘creative wear and tear 
effect’ referred to in van Zon and Yetkiner (2003). In such a ‘love of variety’ set-
up, old technologies never die, but simply become less important and therefore 
less used with the progress of time. This creative ‘wear and tear’ continuously 
and gradually releases labour resources that can be re-employed by the new 
firms created with the aim of using the new technologies that arrive on the 
market.  
                                                 
3 The ‘eye-hand coordination’ of Romer (1990).  
4 This implies that the know-how of workers with respect to using other technologies is not readily 
applicable to new technologies. Hence all workers that are assigned to a job need to learn how to 
perform effectively in that job, through qualifying training, workplace practices training, formal 
job skills training and so on.  
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 While labour productivity can be increased directly by training, the 
productivity of the training process is positively influenced by the level of formal 
education attained by the workforce during the first part of their lives. In 
addition, we assume that the productivity of researchers is positively influenced 
by the level of skills they have accumulated through formal schooling.  
The set-up outlined above suggests that we may expect an interesting 
result to arise in which creative ‘wear and tear’ that is induced by faster arrival 
of new technologies on the market will lead to shorter payback periods for the 
training costs involved in absorbing those new technologies. This suggests that 
faster technological change due to a higher educated population also induces a 
shift in emphasis from specific training towards more general education (cf. 
Lindbeck and Snower, 2000). The reason is that a better educated workforce 
would be more able to adapt to faster changing production circumstances as 
they would arise from a faster arrival of new technologies. In short, we would 
expect there to be a premium on formal education rather than specific training 
in times of rapid technological change. However, we would expect also that an 
increase in the formal level/duration of education could even result in a 
reduction of growth because of the increase in ‘technology absorption costs’ in 
terms of output foregone during re-training spells that arrive at a faster rate, 
but may take a shorter time. This suggests that, from growth perspective at 
least, there may be an optimum level of formal education which would seem to 
be a result that is very useful from an education policy perspective.   
The remainder of this section is organised as follows. In section 2.2 we 
first pay some attention to the different kinds of labour and their supply. Then 
in section 2.3 we describe the demand for labour from a micro-perspective as 
part of our training and production model. In section 2.4 we show how the 
outcomes regarding optimum training durations and quasi-rents depend on the 
structural parameters of the model. Section 2.5 describes the aggregate demand 
for production labour, while section 2.6 describes the demand for R&D labour. 
In section 2.7 all the parts of the model are integrated, and since it has become 
a highly non-linear model, we use numerical simulations to show the main 
relationships between education, training and economic growth at the aggregate 
level. 
 
2.2 Labour supply 
  
 There are two types of labour, low-skilled labour (further called L), and 
high-skilled labour (further called H). L is used in final output production only, 
while H is used as R&D labour (further called HR) or high-skilled production 
labour (further called HP). 
 For reasons of simplicity we will not formulate a fully-fledged overlapping 
generations model. However, we assume the population to remain fixed, but 
constantly needing education, as we would expect it to occur in real life too due 
to the fact that older (educated) generations die, and the youngest are born with 
a clean educational slate. We will model this by assuming that at any time just 
a fraction 1)1(0 ≤−≤ ϕ  of the high-skilled population is available for final 
output production and R&D activities, whereas the complement of that fraction, 
i.e. ϕ , is being educated. To simplify things even further, we assume that L 
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does not need any education.5 Given the above, we must have that the entire 
population P  is given by: 
 
HLP +=           (1) 
 
where H  is the part of the population that is suitable to fill high-skilled jobs in 
final output production and in research activities. From the exposition above, it 
follows immediately that: 
 
PR HHH +=− ).1( ϕ          (2) 
 
 Equation (2) states that the part of the high-skilled population that is not 
in the educational system is either engaged in R&D activities (HR) or in final 
output production activities (HP), while HP itself is in part engaged in training (T) 
and in production (J):  
 
JTHP +=           (3) 
 
 Equations (2) and (3) reflect the assumption that markets are always 
clearing, and so there is no unemployment pool that absorbs excess supply. 
Equation (2) also indicates that educated high-skilled R&D labour is a perfect 
substitute for high-skilled production labour, and the other way around. 
 
2.3 Labour demand 
 
2.3.1 The demand for intermediates 
  
The demand for labour is derived from the assumption that output is 
produced under perfectly competitive circumstances, by assembling the 
intermediate outputs of a set of imperfectly substitutable production 
technologies using low-skilled labour only. We use an Ethier function to 
describe this final output production process: 
 
dixLY
B
i∫⋅= −
0
1 αα          (4) 
 
In equation (4), Y is final output, B is the index of the latest technology 
that has entered the production phase, and xi is the volume of intermediate 
output associated with production technology i. )1( α−  is the partial output 
elasticity of low-skilled labour. 
 For reasons of simplicity, we assume that one unit of each intermediate 
good requires the use of one efficiency unit of high-skilled labour. Efficiency 
units of labour used in the production of xi are called hi.  We therefore have: 
 
Bixh ii ≤≤∀= 0          (5) 
                                                 
5 This is a strong assumption, but it reflects the notion that high-skilled workers generally have 
been educated for far longer periods than low-skilled workers (OECD, 2001).  
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We subsequently assume that one physical unit of high-skilled labour 
associated with technology i (further called ji) can generate ),( ϕπ s  efficiency 
units of labour. The term ),( ϕπ s  is therefore the productivity of labour, and s 
measures the length of time spent training by this worker, while ϕ  is a direct 
indicator of the time spent in formal education/schooling. Consistently with 
human capital theory, we assume 0/,0/ >∂∂>∂∂ ϕππ s . We therefore have: 
 
Bi
s
x
s
h
j iii ≤≤∀== 0),(),( ϕπϕπ        (6) 
 
The demand for each intermediate, given its price pi, can be obtained 
from the first order condition for profit maximisation by the perfectly 
competitive final output sector: 
 
σ
αα
αα
−
−− ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛⋅=⇔⋅⋅=∂
∂= iii
i
i
pLxxL
x
Yp 11      (7) 
 
where 1
1
1 >−= ασ  is the elasticity of substitution between intermediates.  
The corresponding demand for labour in physical units can immediately 
be obtained by substituting (5) and (6) into (7): 
 
),( ϕπ
α
σ
s
pL
j
i
i
−
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛⋅
=          (8) 
 
Equation (8) represents the derived demand for labour for each 
intermediate goods producing firm, given the price it sets for its intermediate.  
 
2.3.2 Maximising the net present value of expected quasi-rents 
 
The price setting behaviour referred to above, together with the behaviour 
that determines how long the training period s should be, can be formulated as 
the solution to the problem of maximising the net present value of the flow of 
quasi-rents that can be obtained by hiring a population of workers, training 
them for s time-units, and then using these trained workers to generate output 
that is sold conditional on the inverse demand curve (7) and its expected 
evolution over time. For, as we will show later on, in a situation of steady state 
growth, wages may be expected to grow equally steadily, and so prices (being set 
using a mark-up over marginal costs) can be expected to grow steadily too. 
 Because of the symmetry between firms - all firms have the same 
production technologies and contribute in the same way to final output -, the 
training period s will be the same for all (relatively) new firms too. Hence, wages 
are the same for each firm too. We assume furthermore that wages offered to 
trainees are the same as those for high-skilled workers associated with firms 
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that are in their production phase already. The structure outlined above has 
been depicted in Figure 1. 
In Figure 1, the demand for labour to produce an intermediate invented 
at time t = 0 is depicted for all moments in time after t = 0, for a given and 
constant growth rate of wage. An intermediate comes onto the market after a 
training phase of duration s. During that phase, the wage rate is assumed to 
rise at a given proportional rate, and consequently (see equation (8) and (10) 
further below) the demand for labour at time t> s that is associated with the 
intermediate invented at time t = 0 , i.e. jt , will fall. However, it would be a 
waste of resources to train more workers than would actually be needed from 
the start of the production phase at time s, hence a rational entrepreneur would 
hire js workers during the training phase of the intermediate and then slide 
down the labour demand curve from the start of the production phase at time s. 
 
   
Figure 1 
  
Figure 1 is formalised as follows. One should recall that due to the 
symmetry between firms, the training period s will be the same for all firms, 
including new ones. Hence, wages are the same for each firm too. Assuming 
furthermore that wages offered to trainees are the same as those for high-skilled 
workers associated with firms that are in their production phase already, the 
net present value of the expected flow of quasi-rents (further called Q) for a firm 
that has bought the latest blueprint at the current time (taken to be time zero), 
is given by: 
 
ττϕπ
τρτρ dwejd
s
xwxpeQ T
s
s
T
TTT
s
∫∫ ⋅−∞ ⋅− ⋅−⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −⋅=
0),(
.      (9) 
 
     js 
 
jt 
0   s t 
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where ρ  is the rate of discount, and wT is the expected wage rate per physical 
unit of labour at time T (T ≥ s) 6. In equation (9), where we have used (6) to 
replace high-skilled labour demand by the demand for intermediates, the first 
integral describes the flow of quasi-rents, since labour is the only factor of 
production. That flow starts only after the training-phase has ended and the 
production-phase has begun. The training-phase takes s units of time. During 
the training-phase, js physical units of labour need to be trained, since that is 
the amount of labour needed when the production-phase starts. There are 
training costs involved, and the present value of these costs is given by the 
second integral in (9). The intermediate goods producer now has two 
independent controls to be determined. The first one is the Q - maximising price 
of intermediates, and the second one is the Q - maximising length of the 
training period s. It should be noted that equation (9) can be maximised with 
respect to the price of intermediates only for the future in as far as it refers to 
the production phase.7 By differentiating (9) with respect to pT for T ≥ s, we 
immediately obtain: 
 
)],([
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11 ϕπαϕπε s
wp
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T
T ⋅
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⎟⎟⎠
⎞
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   (10) 
 
which is the familiar Amoroso-Robinson price-setting rule, where 
ασε −−=−= 1
1
 is the price-elasticity of the demand for intermediates (see also 
equation (7)) and where marginal costs are wage costs per efficiency unit of 
labour.8  
 In order to find the Q - maximising value of s, we have to use Leibniz’s 
rule for differentiating integrals, since the bounds of both integrals in (9) 
depend on s.  We therefore get the first-order condition: 
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.
.
),(
.0
0
  (11) 
 
The first term of (11) within curly brackets is the present value of the loss 
in quasi-rents that occurs by extending the training-phase by 1 unit of time 
(marginal opportunity cost of training). The second term is the present value of 
                                                 
6 Note that we have dropped the technology subscripts, because the symmetry of (4) and (5) 
implies that the net present value problem is essentially the same for all intermediate goods 
producers. 
7 The price of a good that is not produced and therefore not sold can hardly be regarded as an 
effective control. 
8 Cf. Aghion and Howitt (1992). 
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the additional training costs for a given number of trainees associated with a 
marginal increase in s (total marginal training costs). The third term is the 
present value of the increase in total training costs for a change in the number 
of required trainees that could be expected to occur if the production phase 
starts 1 unit of time later, i.e. if the training-phase is extended by 1 unit of time 
(marginal direct cost of training)9. The final term represents the present value of 
the benefits from extra training (marginal training benefit), since these would 
increase labour productivity and hence decrease production costs for the entire 
duration of the production phase. Equation (11), indeed, represents the equality 
condition between marginal benefits and marginal costs of additional training.  
In order to find the optimum length of the training phase, it is necessary 
to specify the productivity function ),( ϕπ s . In order to keep the analysis as 
simple as possible and to accommodate the stylised fact that the higher an 
individual’s level of education the faster (s)he learns, so reducing training costs 
born by firms (Rosen, 1976) we have chosen the following Cobb-Douglas  labour 
productivity-augmenting specification: 
 
11 1
0),(
γγ ϕγϕπ −⋅⋅= ss          (12) 
       
where 0γ  and 1γ  are positive and constant parameters and where 10 1 ≤≤ γ . 
From equation (12) it is clear that some training and education are always 
necessary, since otherwise productivity would be zero. One observes that the 
productivity level of a worker is a geometric weighted average of the worker’s 
educational level, as proxied byϕ , and the level of training as proxied by s, 
where 1γ  is the relative weight or intensity of training in productivity, and 0γ  is 
a constant scale parameter10. Equation (12) shows that a constant level of 
productivity of a worker can be attained for different combinations of s and ϕ , 
where a decreasing value of s must be compensated by an ever increasing value 
of ϕ  in order to keep productivity constant, and vice-versa. Hence, at the micro-
level, education and training are assumed to be (imperfect) substitutes. 
 
2.4 Sensitivity analysis 
 
By substituting (10) and (12) into (11), we obtain the equation that can 
be used to find the optimum value of s. Unfortunately, that equation is strongly 
non-linear which precludes finding a closed form solution for s. However, we 
can get an impression of the sensitivity of the net present value of the quasi-
rents, i.e. Q, for changes in s by drawing Q as a function of s, for given values of 
the parameters. These ‘base-run’ parameter values are given in Table 1 further 
below.  It should be noted that the equation derived above contains 
(endogenous) variables that are given from the point of view of the individual 
                                                 
9 Indeed, as we will show later on, technical change leads to a continuous upward pressure on 
wages, and hence to a continuous downward adjustment of the demand for labour. So, by 
extending the training period, one would normally need less people to train because of the 
anticipated fall in the demand for labour per technology over time in the steady state. 
10 For instance, we can interpret γ0 as a proxy of workers’ effort while working.  
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entrepreneur, but that will change endogenously over time in the full model 
that we will specify later on. Presently, we are only concerned with showing that 
the specifications we have chosen for the production structure and the 
productivity function ensure that there is indeed an optimum amount of on the 
job training that depends in an intuitive way on the parameters listed in the 
Table below. It should be noted that these parameter values are just some ‘fake’ 
numbers not reflecting any empirical regularities, except for their signs. 
 
 
 
Parameter Value Parameter Value 
α  0.500 wˆ  0.025 
ρ  0.075 0γ  0.100 
1γ  0.100 ϕ  0.250 
x  1.000 0w  1.000 
L 1.000 δ  0.500 
 
Table 1. Base-run parameter values 
 
In this Table wˆ  is the expected instantaneous growth rate of wages, 
whereas ρ  is the rate of discount.11 x  is a scale factor for the demand for 
intermediates that will be modelled explicitly later on. For our present 
illustrative purposes the only thing that is relevant is that it is a constant. δ  is 
the intrinsic productivity of R&D workers, which will be made more clear later 
on. 
In Figure 2, the downwards sloping curve is the one associated with 
sQ ∂∂ / . One observes that for the specific parameter set chosen here, Q itself 
has a maximum, but Q is relatively irresponsive to changes in s in the 
neighbourhood of that maximum. The maximum of Q is reached for a value of s 
about equal to 0.53. 
 
0.5 1 1.5 2
s
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
Q,dQds
  
 
Figure 2 
                                                 
11 Obviously, in the full simultaneous model, the expected growth rate of w will be an 
endogenous variable. 
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By changing the parameters underlying Q, we can find out more about 
the qualitative and quantitative behaviour of Q and the consequences for the 
optimum value of s. In order to do this, we have increased each of the 
parameters individually by 10% as compared to its base-run value12, and then 
obtained the corresponding graph of Q. The shifts in the graph of Q are a direct 
indication then of the partial derivatives of Q with respect to the parameter 
under consideration for the entire range of values of s. But rather than showing 
all the graphs associated with these partial derivatives, we provide information 
in tabular form below in Table 2. The first column of that Table holds the names 
of the parameters we have changed, while holding the other parameters 
constant. The columns labelled Q and s hold information regarding the sign of 
the partial derivatives of  Q and the optimum value of s (hence the shift in the  
s
Q
∂
∂
-curve) with respect to the parameter under consideration. 
 
 
 
Parameter Q s Parameter Q s 
α  - - 1γ  + + 
wˆ  - - ϕ  + + 
ρ  - - x  + + 
0γ  + + w0 - - 
 
Table 2. Parameter sensitivity 
 
From Table 2 we can conclude that the signs of the changes in Q and s 
are always the same. This indicates that a variation in some parameter changes 
the shape of the Q-curve roughly proportional in all directions measured from 
the origin. Looking at the effects of individual parameter changes, we see that 
an increase in α  implies an increase of the price-elasticity of demand. This in 
turn lowers the profit margin, hence profits themselves, hence the present value 
of the quasi-rents Q too. This will lower the optimum amount of training, as one 
would expect, ceteris paribus. An increase in the rate of discount ρ  has 
qualitatively the same effects. The present value of the quasi-rents is negatively 
affected, and so is the optimum amount of training. A rise in the productivity 
parameter 0γ  raises both the present value of the quasi-rent and the value of 
the optimum amount of training, again as expected. This fact can open the 
possibility to test a positive relationship between the effort of workers on the job 
(see footnote 11) and the amount of training the firm offers them. A rise in 1γ  
raises the contribution of training to productivity. It also reduces the 
contribution of education to productivity. The net effect on the present value of 
the quasi-rents is positive but very small, while the effect on the optimum 
                                                 
12 The sensitivity analysis has been carried out for ±1% and  ±10% variations in the parameters’ values. In 
the paper we report only the +10% case.  
 19
amount of training is distinctly positive. A change in the amount of formal 
education ϕ  has a positive effect on productivity, hence on Q. It also raises the 
optimum amount of training, indicating that the optimizing behavior underlying 
the choice of the amount of training turns education and training into 
complements from an observational point of view13 rather than the substitutes 
that they formally are, given the specification of the productivity function we 
have chosen (cf. (12)). A change in the growth rate of wages reduces Q. It also 
reduces the optimum amount of training, since not only training costs rise 
during the training phase, but in addition to this, quasi-rents during the 
production phase will fall. Similar results can be observed for a rise in the 
initial wage rate. Both Q and the optimum amount of training fall, because 
profit flows are negatively affected, as with the rise in the expected growth rate 
of wages. Moreover, the payback period is reduced, thus putting a bonus on 
starting the production phase earlier than with lower initial wages. Finally, a 
rise in the autonomous demand for the intermediate under consideration would 
raise both Q and the optimum amount of training, as one would expect. 
 We conclude that the sensitivity results are all plausible, but more 
importantly, the profit maximising behaviour underlying the decision how long 
to train the workforce turns education and training into observational 
complements, even though they enter the productivity function given by (12) as 
direct substitutes. 
 
2.5 Technological change and the demand for labour at the aggregate level 
  
 As in the Romer (1990) model, a new intermediate input is produced in 
accordance with the newest blueprint coming from the R&D sector. The index of 
the newest blueprint produced at time t is A(t), and R&D workers produce these 
blueprints at a proportional rate that is itself proportional to the number of 
R&D workers, as in Romer (1990). We therefore have: 
 
AH
dt
dAA RA ..ˆ δ==          (13) 
 
 Assuming steady state growth in A at a rate Â, we should have that the 
latest intermediate that is actually in the production phase must be the 
intermediate that has just ended the training phase of length s. Let B(t) be the 
blueprint index of the marginal intermediate just entering the production phase 
at time t. In that case we must have that: 
 
 )
ˆ()()()( sAetAstAtB ⋅−⋅=−=         (14) 
 
 Because of the symmetry of (4) with respect to each intermediate, we 
must furthermore have that the demand for labour active in the production 
phase is the same for each intermediate. Hence, the demand for all labour in 
the production phase must be given by: 
                                                 
13 This holds under the ceteris paribus assumption. Things will change somewhat in the context of 
the full model, as we will see later on. 
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where )(tj  is the common number of production workers active on each 
intermediate with index less than or equal to B(t), and where we have 
substituted (14) and (8). 
 Because of technical change, i.e. growth in A(t), we find that, according to 
equation (15), the demand for labour would grow as fast as A(t) itself, ceteris 
paribus. For a given level of supply of production labour, this implies that the 
wage rate is driven up to maintain equilibrium between the demand for 
production labour and the given supply of production labour. In fact, taking 
logarithmic time derivatives of (15), while assuming J(t) to be constant, we find 
that the steady state growth rate of wages must be equal to: 
 
)1(ˆ
ˆ
ˆ ασ −⋅== A
Aw          (16) 
 
 This positive growth in wages implies that the demand for labour would 
drop both for intermediates in the production phase, but more importantly, also 
for labour in the training phase, since we did assume that the workers engaged 
in technology-specific training must be offered a competitive wage, i.e. the same 
wage as that of workers in the production phase. However, if the wage rate is 
expected to rise during the training phase because A(t) grows, then the cost-
efficient amount of labour to hire for the newest intermediate with index A(t) at 
time t would be )( stj + , since that is exactly the amount of production labour 
that will need to become active after the training phase on intermediate with 
index A(t) has passed. Something similar happens for all intermediates in the 
training phase, with an index i such that B(t) ≤ i ≤ A(t).  
Let )(iτ  be the moment in time when the intermediate with index i was 
invented. Then, in a situation of steady state growth, and assuming A(0) = 1, we 
must have that: 
 
A
iLogiei iA ˆ
)()()](.ˆ[ =⇔= ττ         (17) 14 
 
Furthermore, the demand for labour during the training phase would be 
equal to the number of workers that would be optimal at the time the 
production phase of intermediate i commences. This amount of labour for 
intermediate i is given by: 
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ττ 2
),(
])([])([ ⋅⎟⎟⎠
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⎜⎜⎝
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−
s
siwLsij        (18) 
                                                 
14 From equation (17) it is easy to see that the higher the rate of innovation, the earlier the moment in time 
when a new intermediate is invented.  
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where ])([ siw +τ  is the expected wage rate at the time intermediate i enters its 
production phase. For a given and constant growth rate of wages, we can write: 
 
)].(ˆ[
1
1).()( ttwetwtw −=          (19) 
 
 Substituting (17) and (19) into (18), we immediately find the demand for 
labour for intermediate i that is in the training phase at time t: 
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 We see from (20) that the demand for labour during the training phase 
depends negatively on the duration of the training period s. It also depends 
negatively on the time of arrival of an intermediate: the younger it is, the longer 
the period during which training will have to take place, and the lower will be 
the corresponding demand for labour. Given (19), total demand for labour 
associated with all intermediates in the training phase can be obtained through 
integration over all intermediates in the training phase: 
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 Application of l’Hopital’s rule to equation (21) results in: 
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 Then, using (22) and (15), we find that: 
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 The number of workers in the production phase relative to the number of 
workers in the training phase falls if the duration of the training period 
increases, while it also falls if the rate of technical change increases. The latter 
is easy to understand, since the share of the number of intermediates in the 
training phase must increase if Aˆ  increases.15 Consequently, more people will 
receive training in times of faster technical change (see stylized facts number 1, 
2 and 3). 
                                                 
15 This share is equal to )
ˆ(1/1/)( sAeABABA ⋅−−=−=− . For positive s, this share increases 
with Aˆ . 
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 We can now obtain the total demand for production labour HP both in the 
production phase and the training phase by adding (15) and (22) together. 
Then, using (3), we can invert this relation to get the equilibrium wage rate that 
would clear the market for total production labour both in the training and the 
production phase: 
σσασ αϕπ /12).ˆ( )ˆ1(),().()( ⎪⎭
⎪⎬⎫⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ ⋅+⋅⋅⋅⋅=
−
P
sA
H
sAsLetAtw     (24) 
 
 We see that in the steady state the growth rate of wages would still be 
given by (16). We also see that an increase in the availability of production 
labour would depress wages, as we would expect. At this stage a deeper 
analysis is not possible since s itself, but also Aˆ  (see section 2.6 below), 
depends (non-linearly) on wages and wage growth.  However, in section 3 we 
will use (24) as part of a system of simultaneous relations to find out about the 
connection between education, on-the-job training, technology adoption, 
production and innovations’ growth at the aggregate level. Before doing that, 
however, we must describe the demand for R&D labour. 
  
2.6 The demand for R&D labour 
 
In this section, we slightly amend the R&D production function that 
Romer (1990) has used, in that we take into account the productivity effects of 
education on the direct productivity of high-skilled R&D workers. In fact, we 
assume for simplicity that this productivity effect is equally strong in 
production and in R&D activities. So we include the term 11 γϕ −  as we did in the 
productivity equation given by (12). We therefore have: 
 
11/ˆ γϕδ −⋅⋅== RA HAAA &         (25) 
 
 As usual a dot over a variable denotes its time-derivative. Assuming, as 
Romer does, that the present value of the expected quasi-rents can be captured 
by the blueprint producers, and that R&D wages equal the marginal benefits 
from hiring an additional R&D worker, we find an expression for the R&D 
workers’ wage rate: 
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 Substituting (9) for Q as well as (10) for all the intermediates that are in 
the production phase16, we find a complicated expression for the wage rate for 
R&D workers that depends on the wage rate of production workers. When we 
substitute (24) into that expression, we can find out the value of HP as a 
function of all the variables and parameters of the model, for which wages for 
the high-skilled workers earned in both their uses (as R&D and as production 
                                                 
16 We assume that there is no output, hence no sales, on intermediates during the training phase. 
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workers) are equal. Because of the possibility of labour market arbitrage, the 
latter is an equilibrium condition. Hence, we get: 
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 This equation is hard to interpret, since we still need to substitute for Aˆ  
using (25) but also for s, and subsequently equation (2) to obtain the final 
solution for HP. Indeed, substituting (2) into (25), we get: 
 
11]).1[(ˆ γφδϕ −⋅⋅−−= APHHA        (28) 
 
The simultaneous solution to (27) and (28) is highly non-linear and it 
does not have a closed form; this forces us to investigate the properties of our 
model in a numerical/graphical way. This is done in the next section. 
 
3. The full model: some numerical simulation results 
 
 The simultaneous model that we are going to solve numerically for the 
variables TJHHAs RP ,,,,ˆ,  consists of the following equations: 
 
1. equation (16) that describes the link between technical change and wage 
growth; 
2. equation  (27) that describes the equilibrium level of production labour 
demand; 
3. equation  (28) that describes the rate of technical change in function of the 
level of production labour; 
4. equation (23) that describes the ratio of production labour in the production 
phase relative to production labour in the training phase; 
5. equation (2) that describes the constraint on the use of high-skilled labour 
as R&D workers and production workers; 
6. equation (3) that describes the requirement that each production worker 
must either be producing or be training at any point in time. 
 
We now put the productivity parameter associated with the R&D production 
function (28), i.e. Aδ , equal to 0.5 and then solve the simultaneous model for 
varying values of ϕ , i.e. the level of education of high-skilled workers proxied by 
the duration of formal education, whereas the other parameters still have the 
values shown in Table 1, except for the growth rate of wages that is now linked 
to the rate of technical change through equation (16), and x , that is given by 
the parameter combination σα⋅= Lx  (cf. equation (7)). The way in which the 
equilibrium steady state growth rate Aˆ  depends on the amount of education 
can now readily be observed from solving the simultaneous system outlined 
above, for all values 10 ≤≤ ϕ . The result is presented in Figure 3. In this figure, 
we find two curves with an ‘inverted’ U-shape. The solid curve is the one 
associated with a value of 5.0=δ , whereas the dotted curve is associated with a 
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value of 6.0=δ . The vertical axis of figure 3 below is associated with the growth 
rate of A, indicated by GA. 
Looking at this figure, there are two main conclusions to be drawn. First of 
all, the rate of technical change depends positively on the value of the 
productivity parameter Aδ , since the dotted curve lies entirely above the solid 
curve. Secondly, from a growth perspective, there seems to be an optimum 
value of the level of education, since the growth curve reaches a definite 
maximum for 43.0≈ϕ . The reason why the curve has an inverted U-shape is the 
following: if an individual spends all his/her time at school, (s)he does not 
produce output. If an individual spends no time at all at school, on the 
contrary, (s)he does not get trained enough to produce; this follows immediately 
from (28).  
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Figure 3    Figure 4 
 
We have also plotted the corresponding graphs for the duration of 
training s, as shown in Figure 4. This graph shows that for low levels of 
education, an increase in the level of education will be associated with a lower 
level of training, suggesting that training and education act like substitutes. For 
high levels of education, however, the amount of training rises with the level of 
education itself, suggesting that education and training act like complements. 
This result is consistent with the mixed results we have found in the 
introductory part regarding the complementarity/substitutability of training 
and education in function of the level of education. However, we still have to 
explain the downward sloping part of the curves, since our partial sensitivity 
results on the link between the duration of training and education was positive. 
Concerning this, we should recall that on the downward sloping part of the 
curve in figure 4, the rate of technical change is rising, as we can see from 
figure 3, and therefore also the growth rate of wages (cf. equation (16)). Table 2, 
that contains our partial sensitivity results, shows that an increase in the 
growth rate of wages reduces the optimum amount of training, because profit 
flows are strongly eroded. On the downward sloping part of the training 
duration curves above, the rise in the growth rate of wages causes training 
levels to fall by more than the optimum amount of training expands with an 
increase in the level of education. When the rate of technical change starts 
falling again after ϕ  starts exceeding its growth maximising value, the growth 
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rate of the wage rate is reduced as well, and the partial complementarity results 
become stronger again, resulting in the observed positive correlation between 
education and training for higher levels of education. Interestingly, this 
downward shift of the training duration curve signals that in times of strong 
technical change, general education becomes a relatively more important 
determinant of productivity than technology specific training, since for every level 
of general education, the optimum level of training falls. 
 Figure 5 shows how the number of R&D workers changes with the level 
of education. Again, this is as expected: at first the number of R&D workers 
rises for an increase in the level of education, and then it falls when the 
reduction in available hours per R&D worker falls below the increase in the 
absolute productivity of that worker. Since the direct impact of education on 
R&D productivity is subject to diminishing returns, the hours-reduction effect 
will start to outweigh the positive productivity effect for values of the levels of 
education above )2/()1( 11 γγϕ −−= .  
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Figure 5     Figure 6 
 
 
In Figure 6, we depict what happens to the number of workers in the 
training phase. The results are very interesting on two accounts. First, an 
increase in the productivity of R&D workers raises the number of production 
workers in the training phase. This is consistent with the idea that increased 
technical progress brings about stronger ‘creative wear and tear’ of technology 
specific knowledge, requiring more people to be retrained. Secondly, the number 
of people in the training phase peaks at levels of education that are somewhat 
lower than in the low productivity/growth case. This is due to the fact that the 
strong upward pressure on wage growth for low but growing levels of education 
have a strongly negative effect on the duration of training (see Figure 4) that 
leads to a fall in the number of people in the training phase even before the 
peak in the rate of technical change itself has been reached. 
 
 
4. Summary and Conclusions 
 
 In this paper we have presented a simple model that integrates training 
decisions at the micro-level with education decisions at the macro-level in an 
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endogenous growth setting. Our model is constructed to explain the observed 
link between training, education and technical change through the 
incorporation of a number of stylised facts regarding training, education and 
new technology adoption by firms. Based on these stylised facts, we want to be 
able to investigate: i) the nature of the interplay between education and on-the-
job training, and ii) the nature of the link between innovations’ growth 
performance on the one hand and the relative importance of general education 
and technology-specific training on the other. 
 The training decisions referred to above are part of a set-up where new 
intermediate goods are continuously invented in a ‘love of variety’ production 
model in which low-skilled workers use intermediates to produce final output in 
a completely standardised production process. The intermediates on the other 
hand require the input of high-skilled human resources. Because of the 
specialised character of the intermediates, these high-skilled workers need to 
learn how to produce these new intermediate goods. In order to do that, they 
first enter an implicitly successful training phase before entering the production 
phase. During the training phase, production workers do not produce anything, 
or we can think they produce a so little amount of output that can be supposed 
to be closed to zero. Thus,  an intertemporal trade-off arises for the employers: 
in fact, the training process itself increases the productivity of the trainees, so 
that cost-savings for the firm in the future can be realised. In the meantime, 
employers will have to offer a competitive wage to the trainees, since the latter 
have the option of working in other firms that are already in the production 
phase, earning the competitive wage. We show that when employers are 
maximising the stream of quasi-rents associated with producing intermediate 
goods, there is an optimum duration of training.  
With respect to the productivity increase through training, we assume 
that that is positively affected by the level of education of a trainee: a high level 
of education makes it relatively easy to adopt new, technology-specific, 
knowledge. This is consistent with the stylised facts. So, from a productivity 
point of view, the level of education and the amount of training are assumed to 
be indirect substitutes. When we analyse the firm’s quasi-rents maximization 
problem, we find that if the level of education increases then the optimum 
amount of training increases as well, which is consistent with most of the 
empirical evidence presented in the introduction of the paper. This 
observational complementarity comes from the fact that for a rise in the level of 
education, a corresponding rise in the level of training requires relatively little 
extra-costs, whereas, ceteris paribus, the period during which the resulting cost 
savings can be realised can be relatively long. This result confirms the empirical 
evidence that consider formal education and employer-based training as 
mutually reinforcing factors in the process of competence building. We then 
complete the general equilibrium growth model by adding an R&D sector as in 
Romer (1990), where we introduce the level of education as a factor that 
determines the productivity of high-skilled R&D workers in the same way as 
that of high-skilled production workers. In addition to this, since time spent on 
education cannot be spent either as production time or R&D-time there is also 
a negative impact of the increase of the educational level on the availability of 
high-skilled R&D time. This defines an inverted U-shaped relationship between 
the rate of technical change, as captured by the rate of growth of the number of 
intermediates, and the level of education. We close the model by aggregating 
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over all technologies to obtain aggregate demand being the sum of production 
labour for all technologies in their production phase and in their training phase, 
when applicable, and R&D labour. We then solve the aggregate rate of technical 
change, aggregate production labour demand, aggregate demand for labour in 
the training phase and aggregate R&D labour demand for an exogenously given 
level of education. We then increase the productivity parameter associated with 
the R&D process to see what a higher rate of technical change means for the 
variables under consideration. We find that this does indeed raise both the 
number of R&D workers and the rate of technical change, as expected. We also 
find that the observational complementarity between education and training 
turns into a U-shaped relationship between the duration of training and the 
level of education, indicating observational substitutability for low levels of 
education and complementarity for higher levels of education. This 
observational substitutability arises from a general equilibrium effect, that 
pushes up wages as the rise in the level of education raises the growth rate of 
the economy and hence the demand for production labour. This reduces the 
optimum duration of training, as was shown in the parameter sensitivity 
results. We also observe that this U-shaped curve shifts downward in the 
training and education-plane when technological change speeds up, thus 
changing the training and education mix in favour of general education in times 
of faster technical change. We find furthermore that the rate of technical change 
peaks for a certain level of education, indicating that there is a growth 
maximising level of education.  
We conclude that our model, that uses standard constructs from new 
growth modelling, reproduces the mixed findings regarding the substitutability 
and complementarity between education and training. Our model also indicates 
that there is a socially optimal level of education (and training) that implicitly 
defines a socially optimal level of the human capital stock. Furthermore, the 
inverted U-shape we find for the relationship between the growth rate of 
innovations and the level of education confirms the results previously achieved 
by the neo-Schumpeterian growth literature (cf. Aghion and Howitt, 1998).  
 Finally, our model shows that in times of increasing technical change, 
the optimum ‘portfolio- mix’ between education and training changes in favour 
of the former, since that provides a relatively solid basis for the development of 
technology- specific skills that are prone to creative destruction.  
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